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I. INTRODUCTION
"Should a civilized society levy its most extreme punishment against
someone who cannot fully understand it? Against someone who could not
help his own lawyers defend him? Against someone who may have
confessed to 'help out' the police, not realizing he's just helped himself to
the death chamber?"' Today, on death rows across the United States, sit a
number of men and women with the minds of children awaiting execution.
These people are mentally retarded. Typical of these individuals is Ernest P.
2McCarver, who is currently on death row in North Carolina. McCarver was
convicted of first-degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon, and
he was sentenced to death.3 Although McCarver is now forty-one years old,
he has the mental capacity of a ten-year, five-month-old child,4 and an IQ5 of
sixty-seven.6  "[His] impairments [are] such that he could not perform
typical daily activities. For example, he [is] unable to use the telephone
book to find a place where he could order pizza."7 "In other words, his
capacity to perform these activities satisfactorily without assistance is more
like that of a preadolescent youth than an adult."'
McCarver is to be executed despite the fact that he is mentally retarded
and has the mind of a ten-year-old. In challenging his sentence, McCarver's
1. Rosa Enrenreich & Jaimie Fellner, Beyond Reason: The Death Penalty and
Offenders with Mental Retardation, 13 HuM. RTs. WATCH No. I(G), at 2 (2001), available at
http://www.hrw.orglreports98/pbsjanjun2kl.htm.
2. Death Penalty Information Center, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty,
(1997), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgldpicmr.html (last visited July 23, 2001).
3. State v. McCarver, 402 S.E.2d 25, 31 (N.C. 1995).
4. Id.
5. "An intelligence test that generates an IQ score measures the intellectual
functioning of mentally retarded people and any impairments in their adaptive behavior."
Mary D. Bicknell, Constitutional Law: The Eighth Amendment Does Not Prohibit the
Execution of Mentally Retarded Convicts, 43 OKLA. L. REv. 357, 360 (1990).
6. McCarver, 402 S.E.2d at 25; see also Raymond Bonner, Ban on Execution of the
Retarded is Vetoed in Texas, N.Y. TIMEs, June 18, 2001, at Al (stating Ernest McCarver's
IQ).
7. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 7-8, State v. McCarver, 402 S.E.2d 25 (1995) (No. 00-
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basis for prohibiting such executions is that his "execution would violate the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
because [he] is retarded and there is now a national consensus against
executing the mentally retarded."9 In McCarver's case, the United States
Supreme Court considers whether attitudes have changed over the past
twelve years to the point where executing people with mental retardation
violates society's ideas of what is decent.' Ernest McCarver is not a rarity
among death row inmates. Although it is unknown how many of the 3700
people on death row in the United States are mentally retarded, experts say
"between 200-300 inmates" 11 suffer from mental retardation.
On June 12, 2001, Florida Governor Jeb Bush signed into law a bill
banning the execution of mentally retarded persons. 12 The United States
Supreme Court, in its term beginning in October, will consider the question
of whether executing those with mental retardation offends society's
"evolving standards of decency" and thus violates the Eighth Amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishment.13  Whether executing the mentally
retarded offends society's "evolving standards of decency" and hence a
violation of the Eighth Amendment, is a question that has plagued the
criminal justice system and state legislatures since the Supreme Court
decided Penry v. Lynaugh14 twelve years ago. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, on behalf of the majority, wrote "[w]hile a national consensus
against execution of the mentally retarded may someday emerge reflecting
the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,' there is insufficient evidence of such a consensus today"'15 to
conclude that it is "categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment."'
16
9. Id. at 6; see also Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2.
10. See Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2.
11. Chris Adams, Executing the Mentally Retarded Cruel and Unusual?, CHAMPION,
May 2001, at 10; see Raymond Bonner & Sara Rimer, Executing the Mentally Retarded Even
as Laws Begin to Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2000, (stating that of the 3600 people on death
row, approximately ten percent of the inmates are mentally retarded).
12. FLA. STAT. § 921.137 (2001).
13. Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra note 7, at 9-14; see also Bonner, supra note 6, at Al
(discussing the Court's consideration of whether executing mentally retarded defendants
offends society's evolving standards of decency); Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty,
supra note 2 (discussing the Court's consideration of whether executing mentally retarded
persons offends society's evolving standards of decency).
14. 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that executing persons with mental retardation was
not a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
15. Id. at 340.
16. See generally Jonathan L. Bing, Comment, Protecting the Mentally Retarded
From Capital Punishment: State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future,
2001]
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At the time of the decision in Penry, in which the Supreme Court held
that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the execution of the mentally
retarded, only one state with the death penalty, Georgia, and the federal
government barred execution of the mentally retarded. 7 Since Penry, fifteen
more states have enacted laws prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded
capital offenders.1
8
Florida, however, is the first state well-known for its frequent use of the
death penalty to pass a law banning such executions.1 9  Therefore, the
Supreme Court may finally determine that sufficient evidence exists to
establish a national consensus indicating that society no longer approves of
nor wishes to sanction the execution of the mentally retarded. Accordingly,
Florida's new law is important to our scheme of justice and is indicative of a
national trend among states with the death penalty to pass such legislation
outlawing the execution of the mentally retarded.
This article begins by explaining in detail Florida Senate Bill 238,
which created section 921.137 of the Florida Statutes, titled, "Imposition of
the death sentence upon a mentally retarded defendant prohibited." Part II
discusses the importance of Florida's legislation. Part III explains the
difference between mental retardation and mental illness. Part IV examines
common attributes shared among individuals who suffer from mental
retardation. Part V analyzes the rationales for executing the mentally
retarded, and whether penological goals are furthered, focusing specifically
on the elements of capital homicide, the inefficiency of capital punishment
as a deterrent, and means of retribution when applied to mentally retarded
defendants. Additionally, it examines the relevant Eighth Amendment
principles and the mentally retarded defendant's capacity to satisfy the
culpable mens rea. Parts VI and VII give a brief overview of significant
prior case law, and examine the United States Supreme Court's position in
Penry v. Lynaugh. Finally, Part VIII highlights the potential impact Florida
22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59 (1996) (discussing the emerging national consensus
argument); Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death:
Charting the Development of a National Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the
Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REv. 911, 925-29 (2001) (discussing Justice O'Connor's
considerations in reaching the Court's decision in Penry); Mental Retardation and the Death
Penalty, supra note 2.
17. Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2; Bing, supra note 16, at
105.
18. Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2.
19. Bing, supra note 16, at 105 (stating that Florida is well-known for its use of the
death penalty).
20. FLA. STAT. § 921.137.
[Vol. 26:269
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 9
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/9
Raphael
Senate Bill 238, banning the execution of mentally retarded persons, will
have on future United States Supreme Court decisions and the emerging
trend to ban such executions among states that have the death penalty.
This article addresses the issue of whether the application of the death
penalty upon persons with mental retardation should be prohibited, because
such a penalty is contrary to society's ideas of what is decent. In addition,
this article explains the reason the death penalty is not necessary to
accomplish the legitimate legislative purposes in punishment, since a less
severe penalty, such as life imprisonment, would adequately serve the same
purpose. Finally, this article discusses the impact Florida Senate Bill 238
will have on future death penalty cases and the emerging trend banning such
executions among those states that have the death penalty.
This article ultimately concludes that the use of capital punishment
against people who suffer from mental retardation is cruelly inhumane and
without justification. Furthermore, Florida is indicative of both a growing
national movement to end such executions, and American standards of
decency that have evolved to the point where capital punishment inflicted
upon the mentally retarded can no longer be tolerated.
I. FLORIDA STATUTE § 921.137: IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE
UPON A MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANT PROHIBITED
A. Statutory Requirements
Florida Senate Bill 23821 was enacted to ban the imposition of the death
penalty on a defendant who suffers from mental retardation. Under section
921.137(1), mental retardation refers to "significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive
behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age
[eighteen]." 22 Under section 921.137(1), the term "significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning... means performance that is two or more
standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence
21. Id.
22. FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2001); see generally Jamie Marie Billotte, Is It
Justified?-The Death Penalty and Mental Retardation, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETICS & PUB.
POL'Y 333, 338 n.23 (1994). "The American Association on Mental Retardation defines
mental retardation as 'significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing
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test."23 Florida Senate Bill 238 does not stipulate how low a defendant's IQ
level must reach to be considered retarded, but uses a definition that
considers defendants "retarded if they have below-normal intellectual
functions and behavior."' "Legislative employees[,] however,] found that
the bill would likely spare any inmate with an IQ of 70 or less."5
A diagnosis of mental retardation requires the presence of impairments
in adaptive behavior in addition to the deficit in intellectual functioning.
26
Adaptive behavior is defined as an individual's effectiveness or degree in
meeting the "standards of personal independence and social responsibility
expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community."27 Individuals'
adaptive behavior refers to how effectively individuals cope with the
demands and ordinary challenges of everyday life, such as cognition,
communication, and impulse control.28
Under section 921.137(4), a defendant who has already been convicted
and sentenced to death may file a motion with the trial judge to determine
whether the defendant has mental retardation. 29  Accordingly, two court
appointed independent experts examine the defendant to determine whether
he or she is retarded. 30 In addition, defense attorneys and the state can pre-
sent evidence from their own experts on whether the defendant suffers from
23. § 921.137(1); see generally James W. Ellis and Ruth A. Luckasson, Symposium
on the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards: Mentally Retarded Criminal Defen-
dants, 53 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 414, 422 (1985). 'The AAMD's definition sets the upper
boundary of mental retardation at an IQ level of 70, which is approximately two standard
deviations from the mean score of 100." Id.
24. Fla. Law Bans Execution for Retarded (June 13, 2001), available at
http:llnews.findlaw.comlap-storieslother/ll 1016-13-2001/20010613003744530.html (last
visited June 13, 2001).
25. Id. See generally Enrenreich, supra note 1.
The vast majority of people in the United States have IQs between 80 and 120, with an
IQ of 100 considered average. To be diagnosed as having mental retardation, a person
must have an IQ below 70-75, i.e. significantly below average. If a person scores
below 70 on a properly administered scored IQ test, he or she is in the bottom 2 percent
of the American population and the first condition necessary to be defined as having
mental retardation.
Id.
26. Ellis, supra note 23, at 422.
27. § 921.137(1).
28. Billotte, supra note 22, at 338; see generally Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 913-14
(discussing definitions of mental retardation); Enrenreich, supra note 1 (analyzing limitations
in adaptive skills, "e.g., communication, self-control, home living, social skills, community
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mental retardation.31 If the trial court concludes by clear and convincing
evidence that the criminal defendant suffers from mental retardation, he or
she is exempt from the death penalty.32 The criminal defendant, however,
remains subject to the other penalties that may be inflicted on a person
convicted of a capital offense, such as life imprisonment.33
Florida's bill banning the execution of the mentally retarded is fairly
weak. It does not contain a set IQ level, but does use a definition that
considers intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior. 4 Contributing to
the weak nature of Florida Bill 238 is the fact that Florida does not do what
most states practice, which is making the determination of mental retardation
before trial. 5 In Florida, the determination of mental retardation will go to
36the jury while deliberating the sentence. This means that the defendant has
already been convicted and sentenced to death. Thus, the defendant must
petition the trial judge to appoint mental health experts to make the
determination after the jury has returned a recommended sentence of death.37
Since the jury considers mental retardation during the sentencing phase of
trial, after already hearing the evidence of guilt, the jury is somewhat tainted.
Section 921.137 of the Florida Statutes is not retroactive. Thus, it does
not apply to any of the 387 people now on Florida's death row,38 all of
whom were sentenced prior to June 12, 2001. 39
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See § 921.137(6). Other penalties that may be imposed on a mentally retarded
person convicted of a capital offense are quite severe and include: "1) life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole, 2) life imprisonment without the benefit of probation or
parole until the defendant has served a minimum of twenty-five years, 3) life imprisonment, or
4) a term of imprisonment of not less than twenty years or more than fifty years." Entzeroth,
supra note 16, at 931.
34. S. 238.
35. Telephone Interview with Paula Bernstein, Information Specialist, Death Penalty
Information Center, Washington, D.C. (July 23, 2001); e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618
(Michie 1993) (Prior to trial, the court will determine whether the defendant is mentally
retarded. The jury will not be "death qualified" if it is found that defendant is mentally
retarded. However, if defendant is convicted, the jury will sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.).
36. Telephone Interview with Paula Bernstein, Information Specialist, Death Penalty
Information Center, Washington, D.C. (July 23, 2001); S. 238.
37. S. 238.
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B. The Importance of Florida's Legislation
Florida's legislation is important to discuss, because it is the first state
well-known for its frequent use of the death penaltyt ° to pass legislation
banning the execution of mentally retarded capital offenders. As noted
above, on June 12, 2001 Governor Jeb Bush, a Republican who is a strong
supporter of the death penalty, signed Senate Bill 238 into law. The bill
"unanimously passed the Florida Senate in March and was only one vote
short of passing the House unanimously in May.' 41 According to Governor
Bush, "people with clear mental retardation should not be executed.' 42 Bush
also said "[t]his legislation will provide much-needed protection for the
mentally retarded in the judicial process. ' 43
Over the last twenty-four years since the death penalty was reinstated in
1976, at least thirty-five offenders with mental retardation have been
executed in the United States.44 Florida has executed four mentally retarded
inmates45 since 1976.46 Of the 3700 inmates currently on death row it is
estimated "between 200-300 inmates are mentally retarded.' 47 Executing
offenders who have retardation is unconscionable and inhumane. The
Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, which "has
40. Bing, supra note 16, at 105 (mentioning that other states well-known for their
frequent use of the death penalty are Texas, California, and Louisiana).
41. Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2; see also Bonner, supra
note 6, at Al (discussing Florida's new legislation banning the execution of the mentally
retarded).
42. Bonner, supra note 11., at Al.
43. Fla. Law Bans Execution for Retarded, supra note 22.
44. Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2 (listing defendants with
mental retardation executed in the United States since 1976, as updated by The Death Penalty
Information Center). "William Ed, attorney with the Office of the Capital Collateral Counsel
in Florida and an expert in death penalty and people with developmental disabilities, has
identified at least nine persons to add to the list." Telephone Interview by Human Rights
Watch with William Ed, Attorney, Office of the Capital Collateral Counsel in Florida (Feb. 6,
2001) (Human Rights Watch can be found at www.hrw.orglreports).
45. Arthur F. Goode, III, a white male with an IQ between sixty and sixty-three, was
executed April 5, 1974, James Dupree Henry, a black male with an IQ in the low seventies,
was executed on July 12, 1974, Mollie Lee Martin, a white male with a dual
diagnosis/mentally insane, was executed on May 12, 1992, and John Earl Bush, a black male
with borderline mental retardation and organic brain damage, was executed on October 21,
1996. Death Penalty Information Center, Executions of Those with Mental Retardation, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgdpicmrexecs.html (last visited June 15, 2001).
46. Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2.
47. Adams, supra note 11, at 10; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 911 (stating
"[b]etween twelve and twenty percent of current death row inmates are mentally retarded").
[Vol. 26:269276
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been interpreted to include punishment that is disproportionate to the gravity
of the offense and the defendant's moral culpability, and imposes
purposeless pain and suffering.
'
"
The Florida law banning the execution of mentally retarded persons
protects people who do not have the capacity to understand the nature of the
crime they have committed. In addition, when combined with the other six-
teen states49 and the federal government that explicitly prohibit sanctioning
the mentally retarded to death, these legislative enactments send out a
50stronger message of a national consensus.
Moreover, public opinion polling data also reflects society's consensus
that the death penalty should not be imposed upon the mentally retarded.5'
For example, in Florida, a 1986 statewide survey revealed Floridians oppose
the use of the death penalty for mentally retarded defendants by seventy-one
percent to twelve percent. This figure is noteworthy, because Florida is a
death penalty state where eighty-four percent of residents favored capital
punishment, while only thirteen percent opposed it.
53
Whether a national consensus has developed against executing those
with mental retardation is the question the Supreme Court will consider this
fall. This question is very important, as will be set forth in detail, because
Justice O'Connor found that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause must be viewed in light of American conceptions of
48. Enrenreich, supra note 1.
49. Currently fifteen states forbid execution of the mentally retarded: Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, New
Mexico, New York, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington. The governors of
Connecticut and Missouri have similar legislation sitting on their desks awaiting approval.
Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2.
50. In Penry, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, said that presently there was
no emerging national consensus against executing those with mental retardation convicted of
capital offenses to conclude that it is "categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment."
492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989). See generally Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra
note 2; Bing, supra note 16, at 105 (discussing the emerging national consensus argument);
Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 921-22 (discussing Justice O'Connor's considerations in
reaching the Court's decision in Penry).
51. John Blume & David Brack, Sentencing The Mentally Retarded To Death: An
Eighth Amendment Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REv. 725, 759 (1988).
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Cambridge Survey Research, Inc., Attitudes in the State of Florida
on the Death Penalty: A Public Opinion Survey 7, 61 (1986)). See also Bicknell, supra note
5, at 369 (discussing the Cambridge Survey).
2001]
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decency.5 4 Although "the Supreme Court has not set a minimum number of
states needed to represent a [national] consensus, 5 5 the Florida law could
strongly evince society's newly evolved consensus against executing the
mentally retarded.
III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MENTAL RETARDATION AND MENTAL ILLNESS
It is critical for courts to understand the distinct differences between
mental retardation and mental illness, rather than lump the two together as
56courts often do. This has serious and unfortunate consequences in the
criminal justice system. It is imperative to recognize that mental retardation
is not the same thing as mental illness.57 The most significant difference is
that "mental retardation is not an illness. '58 This is not to say that mental
retardation and mental illness are mutually exclusive; some mentally
retarded individuals might also suffer from mental illness.5 9  "Indeed,
between twenty to thirty-five percent of all non-institutionalized mentally
retarded persons also have been diagnosed with some form of mental
illness."6
Mental retardation is a developmental or functional disorder that is
permanent, affecting a person's abilities to learn. 61 The mentally ill, by
contrast, encounter disturbances in their thought processes that may be
62episodic, temporary, or cyclical. Some forms of mental illnesses have the
54. Entzeroth, supra note 16, 925-26 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-
31(1989)).
55. Bing, supra note 16, at 105.
56. ld. at 71.
57. Ellis, supra note 23, at 423-25; see also Bing, supra note 16, at 71-72 (stating
mental retardation and mental illness are not the same thing, although the courts have lumped
them together); Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915-16 (stating "[ilt is important to recognize
that mental retardation is not a form of mental illness.").
58. Ellis, supra note 23, at 423; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915-16 (stating
mental retardation is not the same as mental illness).
59. Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915; see also Ellis, supra note 23, at 425 (stating
"some mentally retarded people are also mentally ill").
60. Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915.
61. Ellis, supra note 23, at 424; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915-16 (stating
"mental retardation.., is a permanent developmental or functional disorder").
62. Ellis, supra note 23, at 423.
The American Psychiatric Association defines 'mental disorder' as 'an illness with
psychologic or behavioral manifestations and/or impairment in functioning due to a
social, psychologic, genetic, physical/chemical, or biologic disturbance. The disorder
[Vol. 26:269
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prospect of being cured through appropriate psychiatric treatment or
medication.63 In contrast, psychotherapy or medication will do nothing to
help a mentally retarded individual, although the mentally retarded
individual may be taught how to cope and function with day-to-daa
challenges in order to improve self-sufficiency and adaptive behavior.
Thus, it is not possible to restore a mentally retarded individual's
65competency, unlike that of a mentally ill individual. In order to restore
one's competency, one must be competent to begin with.6 Often, mental
retardation manifests itself either at birth or early childhood; therefore,
restoration of competence to stand trial is inappropriate and meaningless.
67
In contrast, "[o]ften mental illness does not emerge until after the individual
is eighteen years old. 68
IV. MENTAL RETARDATION: CHARACTERISTICS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
RETARDATION
To simply define mental retardation as "a condition in which there are
limits in conceptual, practical, and social intelligence 6 9 does not necessarily
help one understand what it means to be a person with mental retardation.
Moreover, it is imperative to understand the problems that the mentally
retarded individual faces in everyday life that a non-retarded individual does
not. Thus, it is essential to examine characteristics of mentally retarded
is not limited to relations between the person and society. The illness is characterized
by symptoms and/or impairment in functioning.'
Id. at 423; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915-16 (stating "the mentally ill experience
disturbances in their thoughts... [while] mental retardation is not a psychological or medical
disorder").
63. Ellis, supra note 23, at 424; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 916 (stating
"certain forms of mental illness can be treated with medication or psychotherapy").
64. Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 916; see also Bing, supra note 16, at 71 (stating "the
mentally retarded person can never be stripped of his retardation, though his abilities can be
improved").
65. Ellis, supra note 23, at 424.
66. Id.
67. Id. See also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 916 (stating "mental retardation
manifests itself by the time the mentally retarded individual is eighteen").
68. Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 916.
69. Bing, supra note 16, at 72 (quoting AAMR).
2001]
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individuals, especially since several of those character traits have important
implications for the criminal justice system. 70
Many mentally retarded people have limited communication skills, poor
impulse control,71 an underdeveloped concept of moral blameworthiness and
causation, a denial of their disability, a lack of knowledge of basic facts, and
increased susceptibility to the influence of authority figures.72 People with
mental retardation will have limitations in cognitive functioning.73 A men-
tally retarded person will have limited abilities to learn in areas such as
reading, writing, and arithmetic.74 Furthermore, he or she will have limited
75abilities to reason, plan, understand, judge, and discriminate. Moreover, a
person with mental retardation will have grave problems in logical
76
reasoning, strategic thinking, and foresight.
As a result of a retarded individual's limited cognitive abilities, most
people with mental retardation will know less than most people without
70. Many of the following descriptions are borrowed from James Ellis' and Ruth
Luckasson's symposium article, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, supra note 23, at
427-32. Although any attempt to describe individuals who suffer from mental retardation as a
group risks false stereotyping, "[s]ome characteristics occur with sufficient frequency to
warrant certain limited generalizations." Id. at 427; e.g., Blume, supra note 51, at 732.
71. ' 1his characteristic is related to deficits in attention and involves attention span,
focus, and selectivity in the attention process. Thus, a mentally retarded person may have
difficulty, or under some circumstances, totally fail to weigh the consequences of the act."
Blume, supra note 51, at 733.
72. Ellis, supra note 23, at 428-32 (listing characteristics of people with mental
retardation); see also Blume, supra note 51, at 732 (recapitulating Ellis and Luckasson).
73. Enrenreich, supra note 1; see Bing, supra note 16, at 72.
74. See also Enrenreich, supra note 1 (discussing limitations in cognitive function-
ing).
75. Id.
[One expert has summarized the attributes of mental retardation as follows:] Almost
uniformly, individuals with mental retardation have grave difficulties in language and
communication. They have problems with attention, memory, intellectual rigidity, and
in moral development or moral understanding. They are susceptible to suggestion and
readily acquiesce to other adults or authority figures .... People with mental
retardation have limited knowledge because their impaired intelligence has prevented
them from learning very much. They also have grave problems in logic, foresight,
planning, strategic thinking, and understanding consequences.
Id. (quoting Ruth Luckasson, The Death Penalty and the Mentally Retarded, 22 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 276 (1994)).
76. Bing, supra note 16, at 72; see Blume, supra note 51, at 732-34; Ellis, supra note
23, at 427-32; see also Enrenreich, supra note I (explaining the characteristics and
significance of mental retardation).
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mental retardation, even concerning the most basic aspects of life. 77
Furthermore, mental retardation limits the person's ability to understand
abstract concepts, including moral concepts. Often, the mentally retarded
are unable to comprehend the relationship between cause and effect,78 and
cannot understand certain results or consequences of their actions.79 While
many mentally retarded defendants who have committed a crime know they
have done something wrong, they often cannot explain, or are unable to
understand, why the act was wrong.80 For example,
At the trial of a man with mental retardation convicted of raping
and murdering an 87-year-old woman, a clinical psychologist
testified that while the defendant could acknowledge that rape was
"wrong," he was nonetheless not able to offer any explanation for
why. 'Pressed for an answer, [the defendant] admitted not
receiving 'permission' for the rape .... Pressed further, in
desperation, he blurted out, 'Maybe it's against her religion!' The
jury gasped at such an explanation."81
As a result of the inability to comprehend abstract concepts, a mentally
retarded person may be incapable of fully understanding the meaning of
death or murder.8 2 For example, "Morris Mason, whose IQ was between
sixty-two to sixty-six, was executed in 1985 in Virginia after being convicted
of rape and murder. Before his execution, Mason asked one of his legal
advisors for advice on what to wear to his funeral. 8 3
Overall, people who suffer from mental retardation have problems with
attention, memory, intellectual rigidity, and moral development and
understanding.8 4 "The entirety of these characteristics may result in some
77. Ellis, supra note 23, at 431; Blume, supra note 51, at 734 (stating that people with
mental retardation know less than most people without mental retardation).
78. Bing, supra note 16, at 72.
79. Blume, supra note 51, at 733. "[A] mentally retarded individual frequently has
incomplete or immature concepts of moral blameworthiness and causation." Id. See also
Bing, supra note 16, at 72 (stating that many mentally retarded persons have an
underdeveloped conception of blameworthiness); Ellis, supra note 23, at 431.
80. Enrenreich, supra note 1 (explaining limitations concerning the ability to




84. Bing, supra note 16, at 72.
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mentally retarded individuals becoming dangerous without malice
intended.,
85
V. RATIONALES FOR SENTENCING A MENTALLY RETARDED PERSON TO
DEATH: ARE LEGITIMATE PENOLOGICAL GOALS FURTHERED?
A. The Eighth Amendment's Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
As noted above, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment has been interpreted to include punishment that is
disproportionate to the severity of the crime and the defendant's moral
culpability, imposes purposeless pain and suffering, or does not measurably
further the penological goals of either retribution or deterrence.8 6  The
Eighth Amendment has not been interpreted as a static concept.87  The
amendment is interpreted in a "flexible and dynamic manner that reflects
society's evolving standards of decency. '' S The Supreme Court has consis-
tently said that in interpreting the meaning of the amendment, they look to
the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.' ' 9 Thus, an assessment of how contemporary society views the
infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth
Amendment. 9° If the punishment is found to be contrary to society's
standards of decency, then the punishment is prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. 9
When these Eighth Amendment principles are applied to a mentally
retarded defendant who has impaired reasoning abilities, inability to control
85. Id.
86. See generally Blume, supra note 51, at 737-38 (discussing relevant Eighth
Amendment principles); Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 922-26 (analyzing the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); Enrenreich, supra note I (discussing
summary and recommendations and United States law).
87. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1976).
88. Id. at 171.
89. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); accord Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 788-89 (1982); see also Blume, supra note 51, at 738 (stating punishment is
constitutionally impermissible if it offends the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society"); Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 935 (analyzing the Court's
decision in Penry).
90. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
91. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-31 (1989).
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impulsive behavior, and lack of moral blameworthiness, the ultimate penalty
of death is always and necessarily disproportionate to his or her
blameworthiness, and hence unconstitutional serving no legitimate
penological goal.92 Additionally, sentencing a mentally retarded person to
death offends contemporary standards of decency; inherent in mental
retardation is the person's diminished ability to make responsible decisions,
to appreciate the full consequences of his or her acts, and to relate
competently and independently to the world around him or her.93  "At a
minimum, 'the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution.., of those who
are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to
suffer it.'
94
B. The Mentally Retarded Defendant's Capacity to Satisfy the Culpable
Mens Rea
1. Elements of Capital Homicide
Given the reduced ability found in every dimension of the retarded
individual's functioning, the question is whether a mentally retarded
defendant has the capacity to satisfy the mens rea ("guilty mind") 95
requirement to be sufficiently culpable of murder.96 In the thirty-eight states
that presently authorize the death penalty, "the trier of fact must determine
92. Id. at 346.
[Quoting from documents prepared by the American Association of Mental
Retardation, Justice Brennan reasoned that] all [mentally retarded individuals] share
the common attributes of low intelligence and inadequacies of adaptive behavior [as
well as] 'a substantial disability in cognitive ability and adaptive behavior.' The
impairment of mentally retarded offender's reasoning abilities, control over impulsive
behavior, and moral development ... limits [their] culpability so that, whatever other
punishment might be appropriate, the ultimate penalty of death is always and
necessarily disproportionate to [their] blameworthiness and hence is unconstitutional.
Id. at 344-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Blume, supra note 51, at 738 (stating death
is constitutionally excessive punishment serving no legitimate penological goals when applied
to a mentally retarded individual); Enrenreich, supra note 1 (quoting Justice Brennan's dissent
in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 344-46, 1989)).
93. Blume, supra note 51, at 738-39.
94. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986).
95. JostUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINALLAW § 10.01, at 101 (2d ed. 1995).
96. William K. Wetzonis, Capital Punishment for Mentally Retarded Defendants: A
Boundary for the Eighth Amendment Is Drawn, 34 How. L.J. 651, 656 (1991).
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whether the elements of capital homicide have been met. '97 For purposes of
imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded capital offenders, the trier
of fact may consider evidence of mental retardation as a mitigating factor.98
In general, mental retardation is offered in mitigation of punishment.99 It is
also offered to "prove the existence of one or more statutory mitigating
factors, [for example,] 'the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired,' or that the defendant
suffered from a mental disease or defect."'0
The death penalty is reserved for the most culpable capital offenders
who commit the most heinous crimes. 10 A defendant may be sentenced to
death if the defendant acted deliberately and unreasonably and would
continue to be a threat to society.1 2 Acting deliberately, however, is not the
only culpable mental state sufficient for a defendant to be sentenced to
death.1 3  In Tison v. Arizona, 1 4 the Supreme Court held that reckless
indifference for human life is a highly culpable mental state sufficient to
deserve death. 0 5  In sum, for a defendant to be sentenced to death, the
sentencer, at a minimum, must conclude that either the defendant intended to
kill the victim and knew that there was a possibility that the victim could die,
or was reckless and acted without excuse, justification, or in the heat of
passion.1 6 Since a mentally retarded person is of lower intelligence and has
97. Billotte, supra note 22, at 337.
98. Blume, supra note 51, at 741.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See also Beyond Reason, supra note 1 (stating that mentally retarded offenders
should never be placed in the category for the most culpable offenders for whom the death
penalty is reserved).
102. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 310 (1989); see also infra text accompanying
note 197; see also Billotte, supra note 22, at 337-38 (stating that if a defendant acted
deliberately and unreasonably and would continue to be a threat to society, then the defendant
may be sentenced to death).
103. Billotte, supra note 22, at 338.
104. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
105. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987).
In Tison, the defendant, after helping his father escape from prison, watched his father
murder a family of four. The defendant did not participate in the murder but also did
not help the victims. The defendant drove away from the scene of the crime with his
father in the victims' car. Although the defendant did not kill anyone, he was
convicted of felony-murder due to his reckless disregard for the victims' lives.
Billotte, supra note 22, at 338.
106. Billotte, supra note 22, at 338. "Under the Model Penal Code, a defendant is
guilty of murder when: '(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or (b) it is committed
16
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reduced ability in language, ability to control impulsivity, self-concept, self-
perception, moral development, knowledge of basic facts, and motivation, it
is unlikely that such an individual could posses the requisite mens rea to be
found guilty of murder.
107
2. Deterrence and Mentally Retarded Offenders: Inefficiency of Capital
Punishment as a Deterrent
General deterrence is one of the purposes that can justify capital
punishment. 10 8 It focuses on a punishment's effect on society, and whether
the rest of society will be deterred from committing criminal acts. 0 9 General
deterrence occurs when the punishment of one person discourages others
from criminality, because of one's desire to avoid the punishment that a
particular wrongdoer has suffered." 0 That is, "[the defendant] is punished in
order to convince the general community to forego criminal conduct in the
future.""' The driving force behind general deterrent justification is the fear
that one's action, if convicted, will result in punishment.1
2
[Thus, the defendant's] punishment serves as an object lesson to
the rest of the community; [the defendant] is used as a means to a
desired end, namely, a net reduction in crime. [The defendant's]
punishment teaches us what conduct is impermissible; it instills
fear of punishment in would-be violators of the law; and, at least to
a limited extent, it habituates us to act lawfully, even in the absence
of fear of punishment."13
The penological goal of deterrence is not advanced when applied to
mentally retarded defendants. The threat of execution cannot deter a
mentally retarded individual. Deterrence is premised upon the assumption
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life."'
Wetzonis, supra note 95, at 656.
107. Wetzonis, supra note 96, at 656-57.
108. Billotte, supra note 22, at 336, 356; e.g., Enrenreich, supra note 1.
109. Billotte, supra note 22, at 356.
110. Id. at 356.
111. DRBSSLE, supra note 95, § 2.03[B], at 10.
112. Billotte, supra note 22, at 357. While general deterrence is concerned with
deterring others from committing a criminal act by punishing a particular wrongdoer,
"[s]pecific deterrence focuses on the criminal actor and whether he will commit his criminal
act again." Id. at 356.
113. DRrSSLER, supra note 95, § 2.03[B], at 10 (alteration in original).
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that an individual is both capable of considering and understanding the
consequences of his or her actions and capable of controlling his or her
impulses." 4 In Gregg v. Georgia,15 the court stated that whether the death
penalty is a deterrent depends on whether the possibility of the penalty of
death will enter "into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act.""1
6
Accordingly, one must premeditate in order to be deterred." 7
When the deterrence rational is applied to mentally retarded defendants,
it is highly difficult to convincingly maintain that a mentally retarded
defendant has the capacity to premeditate a crime, and process and act upon
the likelihood of death as a penalty for certain proscribed actions." As
previously noted, mentally retarded people have limited impulse control.
"[A] deterrent that depends on rational decision-making will fail to control
these impulsive acts." A mentally retarded person may commit crimes on
impulse that he or she does not realize will result in death. In addition,
limitations in cognitive functioning lessen a retarded person's capability to
plan and calculate a crime, to understand and weigh its consequences, or
assess their options, as do persons of average intelligence or better.2
According to Justice Brennan:
[T]he goal of deterrence would not be advanced, as '[I]t is highly
unlikely that the exclusion of the mentally retarded from the class
of those eligible to be sentenced to death will lessen any deterrent
effect the death penalty may have for non-retarded potential
offenders .... ' Moreover, because of the impairments in the ability
of a mentally retarded person to understand the consequences of his
or her actions and to control his or impulses, it is unlikely that the
114. Billotte, supra note 22, at 361; e.g., Blume, supra note 51, at 742.
115. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that the death penalty is not per
se cruel and unusual punishment).
116. Id. at 185-86; see also Billotte, supra note 22, at 361 (stating the death peanlty as
a deterent depends on "whether the possibility of execution will enter 'into the cold calculus
that precedes the decision to act"'); e.g., Blume, supra note 51, at 742 n.67.
117. Blume, supra note 51, at 742.
118. Id. E.g., Billotte, supra note 22, at 361.
119. Bing, supra note 16, at 80.
120. Ellis, supra note 23, at 429; see Blume, supra note 51, at 729-30 ("[M]ental
retardation is a significant and devastating mental impairment which reduces a mentally
retarded person's moral blameworthiness to a level different in kind from other non-retarded
persons accused of murder.").
121. Ellis, supra note 23, at 429; see also Billotte, supra note 22, at 361 (discussing a
mentally retarded persons difficulty to weigh consequences); Blume, supra note 51, at 733
(discussing impaired impulse control).
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execution of the mentally retarded would deter other mentally
retarded criminal defendants from committing capital offenses.
122
Furthermore, mentally retarded individuals often cannot adequately
understand the correlation between the imposition of a punishment on
another wrongdoer and the result that would occur if they committed a
similar crime.' 23 Thus, because the death penalty serves as a deterrent only
when the criminal offense is a result of at least some premeditation and
deliberation, "the execution of the mentally retarded cannot be justified
under the deterrence rationale."' 24
3. Means of Retribution When Applied to Mentally Retarded Defendants
Retribution is the second justified purpose of the death penalty. Some
believe that punishment is justified if and only if the criminal defendant
deserves it.125 "It is deserved when the wrongdoer freely chooses to violate
society's rules."'126 Retribution looks backward and focuses on the past
behavior of the criminal defendant. 127 Punishment is justified solely on the
122. Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 928 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 348
(1989)).
123. Bing, supra note 16, at 80. In Penry,
Justice Brennan argued... that the execution of mentally retarded offenders violates
the Eighth Amendment because such executions do not measurably further the goals of
either retribution or deterrence. He reasoned that... deterrence cannot be furthered
because the intellectual impairments of persons with mental retardation preclude their
ability to weigh the possibility of the death penalty and calculating different courses of
action. As a result, "the execution of mentally retarded individuals is 'nothing more
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering."'
Enrenreich, supra note 1.
124. Bing, supra note 16, at 80; see Blume, supra note 51, at 742. Justice Brennan
found, the "very factors that make [capital punishment] disproportionate and unjust to execute
the mentally retarded also make the death penalty the most minimal deterrent effect so far as
retarded potential offenders are concerned." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 348 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 95, § 2.03[C], at I1 (stating "[rletributivists
believe... punishment is justified when it is deserved"); Billotte, supra note 22, at 362
(stating "punishment is 'just' if and only if the criminal deserves it").
126. DRESSLER, supra note 95, § 2.03[C], at 11. The rationale of retribution is based
on the "view that humans possess free will and, therefore, may justly be blamed when they
choose to violate society's mores." Id.
127. See id. See also Billotte, supra note 22, at 363 (stating "[r]etribution... focuses
on the past behavior of the criminal rather than the future effect of his punishment").
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basis of the voluntary commission of the crime. 128 Thus, the defendant is
punished based on what crime he committed and what he deserves.' 29
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized, for purposes of
imposing the death penalty, that it is essential that a defendant's punishment
be limited to one's "personal responsibility and moral guilt."'"3 Critical in
"determining personal responsibility and moral guilt, is the mental state of
the defendant." 131  The Supreme Court has recognized further that, "it is
undeniable... that those who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to
cope and function in the everyday world.
1 32
Retribution is premised on the assumption that the defendant punished
had full culpability of his own actions.' 33 Culpability is a crucial aspect to
retributive thought. 34 With retribution, the result of a defendant's criminal
actions does not determine the punishment; culpability must be factored in as
well. 135  Factors that influence moral development include intelligence,
chronological age, mental age, living in an enriching environment, and
opportunity for interaction with others.' 36 As noted above, the common
attributes shared among mentally retarded individuals are low intelligence
and inadequacies of adaptive behavior. In addition, they suffer from a
reduced ability in areas of functioning such as the ability to control
impulsivity, to communicate, remember, and understand. 37 The severity of
mental retardation diminishes the retarded person's ability to both manage
with and perform in the world. 38 It is this diminished ability to function and
the impaired mental state which limit the retarded defendant's moral
128. DRESSLER, supra note 95, § 2.03[C], at 11.
129. Id. See also Billotte, supra note 22, at 363 (stating "[a] criminal is punished
based on what he did and what he deserves").
130. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982); see also Billotte, supra note 22, at
365 (stating "the appropriateness of the death penalty is a question of 'personal responsibility
and moral guilt'); Blume, supra note 51, at 743 (stating "the appropriateness of the death
penalty is essentially a question of 'personal responsibility and moral guilt"').
131. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987); see Blume, supra note 51, at 743-44.
132. Blume, supra note 51, at 744 (quoting Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center, 473
U.S. 432 (1985)).
133. Bing, supra note 16, at 80.
134. Billotte, supra note 22, at 362.
135. Id. at 363.
136. Id. at 365; accord Ellis, supra note 23, at 429 n.78.
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culpability. 139 In fact, due to the severe deficits from which the mentally
retarded person suffers, such an individual cannot be said to be sufficiently
blameworthy to justify the infliction of the sentence of death, because the
defendant's culpability is reduced. 14° For these reasons,, the mentally
retarded "lack[] sufficient moral culpability to advance the goal of
retribution, which requires that a criminal sentence be directly related to the
defendant's personal culpability.
141
Moreover, retribution "depends on the defendant's awareness of the
penalty's existence and purpose."'142 Reduced abilities in cognitive function-
ing may limit the mentally retarded individual's ability to understand the
nature and effects of the death penalty, and the reason for imposing it.' 43
Thus, executions of mentally retarded persons impose a uniquely cruel
penalty and are generally inconsistent with one of the principal purposes of
executions.' 44 At a minimum, "the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution
only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer
and why they are to suffer it."145
In Ford v. Wainwright,'46 the Court stated:
[T]oday, no less than before, we may seriously question the
retributive value of executing a person who has no comprehension
of why he has been singled out and stripped of his fundamental
right to life... Similarly, the natural abhorrence civilized societies
feel at killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with his
own conscience or deity is still vivid today. And the intuition that
139. See generally Blume, supra note 51, at 744 (stating that "this reduced ability to
function and the impaired mental state which changes in kind, not degree, the mentally
retarded person's moral culpability").
140. Blume, supra note 51, at 744.
141. Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 928; see V. Stephen Cohen, Comment, Exempting the
Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty: A Comment on Florida's Proposed Legislation,
19 R.A. ST. U. L. REv. 457,467 (1991).
142. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,421 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
143. See id. at 421-22.
144. See id. at 421.
145. Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). "[S]tates have more rigorous standards, but
none disputes the need to require that those who are executed know the fact of their
impending execution and the reason for it." Id.
146. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
2001]
21
Raphael: Have American Standards of Decency Evolved to the Point Where Cap
Published by NSUWorks, 2001
Nova Law Review
such an execution simply offends humanity is evidently shared
across this Nation.1
47
Putting a mentally retarded individual to death does not further the
punishment goals of deterrence nor of retribution, because it does not ensure
that the criminal gets his just desserts. 148 Only when murder is the result of
premeditation and deliberation, can the death penalty serve as a deterrent.1
49
Since mentally retarded offenders lack the necessary culpability "that is a
prerequisite to the proportionate imposition of the death penalty, it follows
that execution can never be the 'just deserts' of a retarded offender."' 50
In summary, because a mentally retarded defendant's degree of
culpability is qualitatively less than that of a non-retarded capital murderer,
the legitimate penological goal in deterrence and retribution is neither
furthered nor served by executing a mentally retarded offender. Thus, the
death penalty when imposed upon the mentally retarded is cruel and unusual
punishment, and hence unconstitutional, because it is excessive.15
VI. SIGNIFICANT PRIOR CASE LAW
In 1972, the Supreme Court held in Furman v. Georgia,112 that the
states cannot impose the death penalty on a selected group of offenders in an
147. Id. at 409; see also Blume, supra note 51, at 744 n.74 (quoting Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986)).
148. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 348 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982).
150. Penry, 492 U.S. at 348.
Even if mental retardation alone were not invariably associated with a lack of the
degree of culpability upon which death as a proportionate punishment is predicated,
[Justice Brennan argued that he] would still hold the execution of the mentally retarded
to be unconstitutional... [since there is] no assurance that an adequate individualized
determination of whether the death penalty is a proportionate punishment will be made
at the conclusion of each capital trial.... Lack of culpability as a result of mental
retardation is simply not isolated.., as a factor that determinatively bars a death
sentence.
Id. at 346-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151.
In Gregg v. Georgia... the Court defined "excessive" as consisting of two elements. First, "the
punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain[,]" which means that
the death penalty as imposed must advance the penological goals of retribution and deterrence.
Second "the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime."
Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 925.
152. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory manner based solely on the offense
committed. In 1976, the Supreme Court reexamined the death penalty
issue in the context of the Eighth Amendment. In Gregg v. Georgia,154 the
plurality of the Court declared that the Eighth Amendment must be
"interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner" that reflects society's
evolving standards of decency, 55 which is the standard used by the Court to
test the validity of a punishment under the Eighth Amendment.1 56 The Court
made clear, "so long as the class of murderers subject to capital punishment
is narrowed, there is no constitutional infirmity in a procedure that allows a
jury to recommend mercy based on the mitigating evidence introduced by a
defendant.' 5s7 The decision in Gregg further narrowed the class of people
upon which the death penalty may be imposed. 158
Later, in Ford v. Wainwright,159 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits execution of the insane.16 In reaching its decision,
the Court considered that common law prohibited executing the insane. 61 In
addition, the Court found that a national consensus existed, since no state
permitted the execution of the insane, and twenty-six states had statutes
expressly requiring stay of the execution of a capital murderer who became
153. Id. at 255-57; see generally Cohen, supra note 141, at 463.
154. Id. at 171 (plurality opinion).
155. Id. at 171.
156. See id. at 173; see also Cohen, supra note 141, at 463-64 (discussing the holding
of Gregg v. Georgia). The Court looks primarily to existing state legislation to define these
'evolving standards' and the decision in Gregg emphasizes that, when considering capital
punishment, great deference will be given to state legislatures. Id. at 464.
The Court stated: In sum, we cannot say that the judgment of the Georgia Legislature
that capital punishment may be necessary in some cases is clearly wrong.
Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a legislature to
evaluate, in terms of its particular State, the moral consensus concerning the death
penalty and its social utility as a sanction, require us to conclude, in the absence of
more convincing evidence, that the infliction of death as a punishment for murder is
not without justification and thus is not unconstitutionally severe.
Id. at 464 n.71 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 186-87 (1976)).
157. Penry, 492 U.S. at 327.
158. See Cohen, supra note 141, at 464; Bicknell, supra note 5, at 363 (discussing the
significance of Gregg v. Georgia).
159. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
160. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10; see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 363 (discussing the
death penalty and significant cases).
161. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406-07 (1986); see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 363-64
(discussing the death penalty and the significance of Ford v. Wainwright); Cohen, supra note
141, at 466 (discussing the holding in Ford v. Wainwright).
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insane. 162 Moreover, the Court noted the insane should not be executed,
because such an execution has questionable retributive value, no deterrent
effect on people who cannot understand the reason for their execution and
the full implication of the penalty, 16 nor are they able to assist in their own
defense.'6 Finally, the Court declared that executing insane defendants
offends humanity.'
More recently, the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Thompson v.
Oklahoma'66 held that executing a criminal defendant who was under the age
of sixteen years old at the time of their offense constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.167 In
examining the objective evidence of American conceptions of decency, the
plurality found that eighteen states explicitly established in their death
penalty statutes that the defendant has attained the minimum age of sixteen
at the time of the offense. 168
In 1989, the Supreme Court's decision addressing the death penalty in
Penry v. Lynaugh, did not continue its narrowing of the class of murderers
eligible for the death penalty. 69 The Court refused to find that executing a
mentally retarded person was a per se violation of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.170 Instead, the Court held that
the Eighth Amendment did not necessarily preclude the execution of all
mentally retarded persons simply by virtue of their disability alone. 171 TheCourt did hold, however, that the accused is entitled to instructions as to the
162. Ford, 477 U.S. at 408-09 n.2; see, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334
(1989); see also Cohen, supra note 141, at 466 (stating the common law prohibition against
execution of the insane and that most state legislatures exempt the insane from capital
punishment).
163. Bicknell, supra note 5, at 363-64.
164. Cohen, supra note 141, at 466.
165. Id. See also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 363-64 (discussing the death penalty and
the significance of Ford v. Wainwright).
166. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
167. Id. at 838; see Bicknell, supra note 5, at 364 (discussing the Court's decision in
Thompson v. Oklahoma); see also Cohen, supra note 141, at 465. "In reaching its conclusion,
the Court looked to society's evolving standards of decency, the diminished culpability of
minors, and the recognized goals of capital punishment." Id.
168. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989).
169. id. at 338-39; see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 364 (discussing the Court's
decision in Penry).
170. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340. See also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 364 (discussing the
Court's decision in Penry).
171. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
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mitigating effect of mental retardation. 72 The Court reasoned, so long as
mitigating circumstances are considered by the sentencer, "an individualized
determination whether 'death is the appropriate punishment' can be made in
each particular case."
173
In examining objective evidence of the public's attitude toward execut-
ing the mentally retarded, the Court found that only one state banned the
execution of retarded persons who have been found guilty of a capital
offense, and that one state was insufficient to constitute a national con-
sensus.174 In addition, the Court noted that Maryland had enacted similar
legislation, but the statute would not take effect until the following week.
1 75
VII. SUPREME COURT'S POSITION IN PENRY V. LYNAUGH: ALLOWING THE
IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE MENTALLY RETARDED
In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Supreme Court, in a five to four vote, held the
Eighth Amendment did not categorically prohibit the imposition of the death
penalty on mentally retarded defendants. 176  This was the first time the
Supreme Court explicitly sanctioned the execution of a mentally retarded
person.1 77  In the Court's decision, Justice O'Connor wrote, "there is
insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing mentally
retarded people convicted of capital offenses for us to conclude that it is
categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment., 178 Penry was convicted
in Texas of brutally stabbing Pamela Carpenter with a pair of scissors after
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 334.
175. Id.
176. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
On the other hand, the Court has ruled that a person who is insane at the time of his
execution may not be executed. Nonetheless, on January 24, 1992, Rickey Ray Rector,
a man with obvious and profound mental defects, was killed by lethal injection in
Arkansas. Rector shot and killed a police officer, then shot himself in the forehead; he
underwent brain surgery that required removal of three inches of frontal brain tissue.
There was no question that Rector's mental abilities were significantly impaired. In the
days leading up to his execution, Rector's behavior included such bizarre acts as
barking like a dog, stamping his feet, snapping his fingers, repeatedly calling out the
nickname of an old friend, and laughing. When his last meal was served, Rector
devoured his dinner, but saved his dessert to be eaten later-after his execution.
Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 918 n.72 (citations omitted).
177. Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 918.
178. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
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he raped and beat her in her home.179 Pamela died a few hours later while
receiving emergency treatment. 80 Before dying, however, she was able to
identify Penry as her attacker. 81 Subsequently, Penry confessed twice to the
murder. 182 He was charged with capital murder.
183
At a competency hearing before Penry's trial, expert testimony was
presented showing he was mentally retarded.184 Evidence showed that
previous testing indicated that his IQ fell between fifty and sixty-three,
indicating mild to moderate mental retardation.185  The effect of mild to
moderate retardation is, "mildly retarded individuals may learn skills up to
the sixth grade level, and persons with moderate mental retardation are
unlikely to achieve academic skills beyond the second grade level."'
' 86




[E]vidence suggests mentally retarded persons accused of crimes confess much more
readily than do other defendants. This in all likelihood due to the fact that mentally
retarded persons react readily to both friendly suggestions and intimidation, and thus
are particularly susceptible to coercive police techniques. Any confession given by a
mentally retarded individual also presents especially difficult questions concerning
whether he had the mental capacity to understand and validly waive his constitutional
rights under Miranda and the fifth and sixth amendments. Many mentally retarded
people simply cannot understand the Miranda warnings, especially in the form and in
the manner that they are likely to be given by police or prosecutors. This determination
involves inquiry of not only whether the individual understands the concepts contained
in the warnings, what a "right" is, but also whether he understands the language used
to convey the concepts. Even a defendant functioning in the mildly retarded range will
often be unable to understand the concept of legal terms such as "waiver" or even the
elements of the offense with which he is charged unless special efforts are made to
explain them.
Blume, supra note 51, at 736-37.
183. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 307-08.
In addition to his mental retardation, Penry grew up in a home where horrible abuse
was regularly inflicted upon him. Shortly after his birth, Penry's mother suffered a
nervous breakdown and was comnitted to a mental hospital for ten months. When she
returned to her young son, she subjected him to severe beatings, including blows to his
head and cigarette bums on his body. Penry dropped out of school in the first grade
and was in and out of state institutions until he was twelve years old, after which he
went to live with an aunt. It took his aunt a year to teach Penry the simple task of
printing his name.
Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 919.
186. Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 919.
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Before the competency trial, IQ testing indicated that Penry had an IQ
of fifty-four. 117 Additionally, the evaluation revealed that Penry, who was
twenty-two years old at the time of the murder, had the mental age of a six
and one-half year old child, "which mean[t] that 'he ha[d] the ability to learn
and the learning or the knowledge of the average 6 year old kid."" 88
Penry's social maturity, his ability to function in the world, was that of a
nine- or ten-year-old child.189 "H]e could not read or write, name the days
of the week or months of the year, or name the president of the United
States."' 9' The psychiatrist who tested Penry testified that, "'there's a point
at which anyone with [Penry's] IQ is always incompetent, but, you know,
this man is more in the borderline range."' 191  The jury found Penry
competent to stand trial.1 9
During the guilt/innocence phase of Penry's trial, the trial court found
Penry's two confessions to be voluntary and were admitted into evidence.1
93
Penry raised an insanity defense, presenting testimony that his moderate
mental retardation and organic brain damage,194 "resulted in poor impulse
control and an inability to learn from [his] experience[s]." 195 Additionally,
the psychiatrist testified that the brain damage, which Penry was suffering
from at the time of the offense, resulted in the inability "for him to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his [action and] conform his conduct to the
law." 196 In rebuttal, the state put two psychiatrists on the stand that testified
Penry was sane at the time of the crime. 197 They conceded, however, that
Penry had a limited mental ability, an inability to learn from his experiences,
and a tendency to be impulsive and to violate society's norms. 198
187. Pemy v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 308 (1989).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Jamie Fellner, U.S. Execution of Mentally Retarded Condemned (Mar. 20, 2001),
at http://www.hrw.orgpress/2001/03/mrexO320.htm.
191. Penry, 492 U.S. at 308.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 308-09.
194. The organic brain damage was "probably caused by trauma to the brain at birth."
Id. at 307.
195. Id. at 308.
196. Penry, 492 U.S. at 309.
197. Id.
198. Id. At the close of the penalty hearing, the jury was instructed, pursuant to the
Texas death penalty statutory scheme, to answer three "special issues" to determine Penry's
sentence. Id. at 310. Under § 19.03 of the Texas Penal Code, the jury had to answer:
2001]
27
Raphael: Have American Standards of Decency Evolved to the Point Where Cap
Published by NSUWorks, 2001
Nova Law Review
Although Penry was sentenced to death, the Supreme Court overturned
his sentence, because the trial court failed to instruct the jury "that it could
consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of Penry's mental
retardation and abused background by declining to impose the death
penalty." 199
The Court concluded that, by failing to provide the proper instruction,
the trial court did not provide the jury with a "vehicle for expressing its
'reasoned moral response"' to Penry's evidence of mental retardation in
handing down its sentence.
20 0
After Penry was sentenced to death, he sought, and was denied, habeas
corpus relief in the United States District Court.2 1 Penry appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's
decision, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 2. Justice
O'Connor acknowledged the common law prohibition against punishing
"idiots" with the sentence of death, and that such a prohibition suggests that
the execution of a severely retardedjperson may indeed be "cruel and
unusual" under the Eighth Amendment.
The majority opinion strongly expressed that the insanity defense and
their decision in Ford v. Wainwright afforded severely mentally retarded
1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result;
2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.
Id. at 310; e.g., Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 920-21. "If the jury answered "yes" to all three
questions, the penalty of death would be imposed. The jury answered "yes" to all three
questions, and accordingly, the trial court sentenced Penry to death." Entzeroth, supra note
16, at 921.
199. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989).
200. Id.
201. Bicknell, supra note 5, at 365.
202. Penry, 492 U.S. at 312; see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 365.
203. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331-33; see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 365 (discussing
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion).
204. In Ford, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of
people who cannot understand the full implication of the punishment they are about to suffer
and the reason for suffering it. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989) (citing Ford v.
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defendants protection in the criminal justice system.0 5 Since Penry did not
classify as profoundly or severely retarded, the Court reasoned that he could
not qualify for the defense of being unaware of his punishment or its
consequences. 206
Unfortunately, the Court failed to recognize the differences between
mental illness and mental retardation, so they lumped the two together. As
noted above, it is imperative to recognize that mental retardation is not the
same as mental illness.0 7 The most significant difference between the two is
that mental retardation is not an illness.20 8 While some forms of mental
illness can be treated with medication or psychotherapy, the same does not
hold true for mental retardation. 20 9 Medication or psychotherapy treatment
will do nothing to minimize or cure a mentally retarded individual who is not
mentally ill.2' Thus, the Court's conclusion was flawed when it decided
that a mentally retarded defendant is afforded adequate protection under the
insanity defense when the mentally retarded are not insane, and under Ford
v. Wainwright, where the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
execution of the insane.2tl
Although the Court declared that mental retardation alone does not
forbid execution, Penry explicitly states that courts must specifically instruct
205. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333; see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 365 (discussing the
Court's rationale).
206. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333; see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 365 (stating the "Court
reasoned that only severely or profoundly retarded persons could qualify for the defense of
being unaware of their punishment or its consequences").
LT]he Court held that Penry did not classify as severely retarded. The Court reached
this decision based on evidence that Penry, as a "borderline" mentally retarded person,
had the ability to consult with his lawyer, and could rationally and factually understand
the proceedings. From this information, the Court held that mental retardation alone
cannot exempt retarded persons of Penry's abilities from the death penalty.
Bicknell, supra note 5, at 365.
207. Ellis, supra note 23, at 423-25; see also Bing, supra note 16, at 71-72 (stating
mental retardation and mental illness are not the same thing, although the courts have lumped
them together); Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915-16 (stating "it is important to recognize that
mental retardation is not a form of mental illness").
208. Ellis, supra note 23, at 423; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915-16 (stating
mental retardation is not the same as mental illness).
209. Ellis, supra note 23, at 424; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915 (stating
"certain forms of mental illness can be treated with medication or psychotherapy").
210. Ellis, supra note 23, at 424; see also Bing, supra note 16, at 71 (stating. "the
mentally retarded can never be stripped of his retardation, though his abilities can be
improved"); Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 915 (stating "mental retardation cannot be
ameliorated by drugs or psychotherapy").
211. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
20011
29
Raphael: Have American Standards of Decency Evolved to the Point Where Cap
Published by NSUWorks, 2001
Nova Law Review
the jury to consider and give effect to all mitigating evidence of mental
retardation and history of abuse. 21 The Court reasoned that this instruction
was necessary because any punishment imposed must be directly related to
the defendant's personal culpability.
2 13
VIII. A NATIONAL CONSENSUS: A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN SOCIETY'S
STANDARDS OF DECENCY REGARDING THE MENTALLY RETARDED SINCE
PENRY V. LYNA UGH
In Ernest P. McCarver's case this October, the Supreme Court will be
revisiting the issue of whether attitudes have changed over the past twelve
years to the point where executing people with mental retardation violates
214
society's ideas of what is decent. One of the reasons the Supreme Court
refused to exclude all mentally retarded defendants from the death penalty in
Penry was that the defendant did not present any legislation showing that the
215
states were narrowing their sentencing procedures to exclude the retarded.
In order for the Penry decision to be changed and for the execution of the
mentally retarded to end, the Supreme Court must look to "objective
evidence, [such as actions of state legislatures,] to determine how our society
views [this] particular punishment today., 216 Therefore, the Court must
217
assess whether this punishment offends American concepts of decency.
In the twelve years that have passed since Penry, there has been a
pivotal change in the public's perceptions of standards of decency with
respect to sanctioning a mentally retarded person to death.2 18 At the time of
the decision in Penry, in which the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment did not categorically prohibit the execution of the mentally
retarded, only one state, Georgia, and the federal government banned
212. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989); see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at
366 (stating that the decision in Penry clearly requires that courts "give specific jury
instructions that allow the consideration of all mitigating evidence of mental retardation").
213. Penry, 492 U.S. at 327-28; see also Bicknell, supra note 5, at 366 (stating the
Court held the instruction necessary, "because any punishment inflicted must be directly
related to the personal culpability of the defendant").
214. See Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2.
215. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333-34.
216. Id. at 331. Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra note 7, at 12 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
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219executions of people with mental retardation. Maryland had enacted
legislation prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded, but it did not
220go into effect until one week after the Court decided Penry. In her
opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote that even when the Georgia and Maryland
statutes prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded individuals were
"added to the [fourteen] States that have rejected capital punishment
completely, [such legislation did] not provide sufficient evidence at present
of a national consensus'22t to exempt the mentally retarded from the
punishment of death.
Since the decision in Penry, fifteen more states: Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
Washington have recognized that sentencing the mentally retarded to death
is cruelly inhumane and therefore have outlawed such executions.22 Today,
half of the states ban executing the mentally retarded-seventeen of the
thirty-eight death penalty states prohibit executing the mentally retarded and
twelve states and the District of Columbia do not have the death penalty at
all. Also, the federal government does not allow for the mentally retarded to
be executed. When combined, the majority of jurisdictions in this country
prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded. 223
219. Id. at 11; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16, at 926 (stating at the time the Court
decided Penry, only Georgia and the federal government prohibited executing the mentally
retarded); Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that
Maryland and Georgia prohibited executing the mentally retarded).
220. See Pet. for Writ bf Cert., supra note 7, at 11; see also Entzeroth, supra note 16,
at 926 (stating that Maryland's legislation prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded
went into effect a week after Penry was handed down).
221. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334.
222. Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra note 7, at 11; see also Bonner, supra note 7, at Al
(stating that "the federal government bars such executions, as do [fifteen] states"); Mental
Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2 (naming the states that currently forbid
execution of the mentally retarded).
223. Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra note 7, at 11-12. It is important to note, however,
that the Court has held:
[N]either the jurisdictions which do not impose capital punishment, nor the criminal
law practices of the federal government, should be taken into account the figuring of a
national consensus. The jury also discounted the use ofjury determinations as a factor
in consensus determination. The fact that sentencing juries were reluctant to impose
capital punishment on the retarded was irrelevant to the question of a national
consensus.
Bing, supra note 16, at 103.
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The standard for determining the unconstitutionality of this challenged
sanction is whether the selected penalty, here death, is cruelly inhumane and
disproportionate to the crime committed.2 4 In addition, this constitutional
test is intertwined with actions of state legislatures and an assessment of
American contemporary standards. 2  As noted above, the primary and most
reliable indication of a consensus is the pattern of legislative enactment
reflecting public attitude toward sanctioning mentally retarded individuals to
death.226
The fact that seventeen states now specifically prohibit death sentences
for the mentally retarded sends out a stronger message of national consensus
than existed when Penry was decided. However, it is unknown how many
states are needed to represent a consensus, since the Supreme Court has not
set a requisite number. In 1994, when eleven states banned the execution of
mentally retarded individuals, these states accounted for only thirteen
227percent of total executions since the reinstatement of the death penalty.
Most likely, the Supreme Court would have found that these eleven states
did not represent a national consensus.
Today, however, there is plenty of objective evidence of a strong
national consensus against executing retarded persons. So far, this year
alone, four states, Florida, Missouri, Arizona, and Connecticut passed
legislation outlawing the execution of mentally retarded individuals. 22 Since
the death penalty was reinstated in 1976, Florida has executed fifty-one
inmates, four who were mentally retarded, Arizona has executed twenty-two
inmates, one who was mentally retarded, and Missouri has executed fifty-
229
one inmates, two of which were mentally retarded. Connecticut has not
executed any inmates since 1976. 230 Overall, as of 2001, these four states
23
account for 17.71% of total executions in the United States. 3' When
combined with the other thirteen states banning the execution of the mentally
retarded, they account for twenty-three percent of the total number of
inmates executed. 232 This percentage may not seem like a major representa-tion of the national consensus in the United States, but this is only due to the
224. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976).
225. Id.
226. Penry, 492 U.S. at 330-31.
227. Bing, supra note 16, at 105.
228. Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2; see also Bonner, supra
note 7, at Al (discussing states that bar the execution of mentally retarded individuals).
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fact that Texas accounts for such a high number of executions.233 Texas, by
itself, accounts for 34.58% of total executions to date.
234
Florida's legislation is indicative of a national trend towards abolishing
the execution of mentally retarded individuals. As previously noted, on June
12, 2001, Florida became the fifteenth state to ban such executions. In the
post-Furnan era, one of the leading states for executions is Florida. 5
Florida accounts for 7.29% of total executions. 236 It is the country's third
237largest death penalty state, currently tied with Missouri. Missouri became
the sixteenth state, on July 2, 2001, to outlaw the execution of mentally
retarded inmates.238 When combined, Florida and Missouri account for
14.17% of nationwide executions. Because Florida is well-known for its
frequent use of the death penalty, it could influence other states to follow the
national trend banning the execution of the retarded. 239
In contrast, one week after Florida's Governor Jeb Bush signed Senate
Bill 238, Texas Governor, Rick Perry, vetoed similar legislation that would
have banned the execution of those with mental retardation.m Although
Governor Perry chose to veto this bill, the legislature passed it.2' Texas's
own representatives voted to ban executing the retarded, but unlike Governor
Bush, Governor Perry himself did not stand behind the legislation. Texas,
the country's number one death penalty state, has executed ten people this
year, and 249 since 1982. 2
Because it accounts for such a large number of executions, Texas could
have a negative influence on the Supreme Court when it assesses the
public's attitude towards inflicting the death penalty on the mentally
233. Virginia is the country's second leading death penalty state accounting for
11.39% of total executions. Together, Texas and Virginia alone carried out 300 of the 720
executions, accounting for 45.97% of total executions. Id.
234. Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2.
235. It is important to note, however, that in 2000, Florida executed six inmates, and in
2001, executed one. Id. Compare to Texas, which executed forty inmates in 2000 and ten




239. See Bing, supra note 16, at 105.
240. Bonner, supra note 6, at Al; see also Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty,
supra note 2 (stating that Texas Governor vetoed legislation that would have prohibited the
execution of the mentally retarded).
241. Telephone Interview with Paula Bernstein, Information Specialist, Death Penalty
Information Center, Washington, D.C. (July 23, 2001).
242. Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 2 (these estimates are
current through July 17, 2001).
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retarded. Perhaps until a state like Texas passes such legislation, the
Supreme Court may continue to find that there is insufficient evidence of a
national consensus against executing mentally retarded individuals. On the
other hand, the Supreme Court looks to the public's perceptions of decency,
which is ultimately reflected in legislation. Most likely, the Texas
Legislature passed the bill according to how Texans view this particular type
of sanction. The fact that Governor Perry vetoed the bill does not necessarily
mean that the people of the state of Texas support his decision.
Governor Perry vetoed the bill, reasoning that Texas did not execute
mentally retarded offenders, and that there are existing judicial safeguards
implemented to protect the mentally retarded. 243 While Governor Perry
claimed that Texas has never executed anyone who was mentally retarded,
supporters of the legislation and the Death Penalty Information Center both
say six inmates with IQs of seventy or below have been executed since 1982,
two of them while President Bush was governor.2
While the majority of Americans support the death penalty, opinion
polls show that the majority of those people oppose the execution of the
mentally retarded, "even in the fiercely pro-death penalty state of Texas. ' ' 45
Governor Perry's decision to veto, "runs counter to a trend among states that
have the death penalty."246 Whether the movement to end the execution of
the mentally retarded has reached the numbers necessary to reach a national
consensus in the eyes of the Supreme Court is unknown. But one thing is for
sure-if leading death penalty states like Florida continue to enact
legislation banning such executions, there is a greater chance the Supreme
Court will find there is an emerging national consensus against executing the
mentally retarded, and that society no longer wishes to or agrees with
sanctioning the mentally retarded to death.
IX. CONCLUSION
The use of capital punishment against people suffering from mental
retardation is a penalty that is cruelly inhumane and without justification.
Imposing society's most severe punishment on individuals who possess
significant impairments in intellectual functioning and adaptive skills, and
who cannot understand the nature of the crime they have committed or
243. Bonner, supra note 6, at Al. But see Cohen, supra note 141, at 460.
244. Bonner, supra note 6, at Al; see Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty,
supra note 2.
245. Bonner, supra note 11.
246. Bonner, supra note 6, at Al.
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punishment imposed, do not deserve this ultimate penalty. Sanctioning one
of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups to death is nothing short of
barbaric.
The Supreme Court has made clear that it is up to the state legislatures
to protect, and hence exclude, the mentally retarded from execution by
passing legislation.2 7 The only way the Supreme Court will find a national
consensus exists against executing this particular group of people, is if
states, particularly large death penalty states like Florida, continue to enact
legislation banning execution of the retarded.
American standards of decency have evolved to the point where capital
punishment inflicted upon the mentally retarded can no longer be tolerated.
Executing those who may not even understand what death is or why they are
being executed is a practice that must be ended. It is time for our state
legislatures, whom we elect, to take a strong stance on this issue by
outlawing the execution of the mentally retarded. Exempting the mentally
retarded from the death penalty is not an issue of crime, but an issue of
humanity.
Florida and the other sixteen states that oppose the execution of the
mentally retarded do not argue that they should not be severely punished or
held accountable for their crimes. They simply argue that the ultimate
punishment of death, which is reserved for the most culpable criminals who
commit the most heinous crimes, should not be sanctioned upon those
individuals who are less morally culpable.2 The legislation clearly
recognizes that it is excessively harsh to execute a mentally retarded person
with limited intelligence and culpability instead of applying other
punishments that will both punish the guilty and protect society.
Lindsay Raphael
247. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
248. Id.
249. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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